Wittgenstein's Ethics and the Trouble with Literary Value
In Cambridge, in 1929, Ludwig Wittgenstein told the Moral Sciences Club that ethics is where the real, essential part of our language is hidden. The talk survives as the Lecture on Ethics, a stenographic record edited by G. H. von Wright for the Philosophical Review in 1969. It names no novel and no poet, yet it has shaped everything written since about value, including the value we assign to books.
For literary studies, the question is not whether the lecture yields a test for the good novel. It does not, and its author knew as much; Malcolm records that Wittgenstein later regretted delivering it, saying he had not understood his own argument. The real question is what happens when a critic writes that a novel is great. If the verdict were a proposition, it should be checkable against evidence. The lecture's wager, that value rests in what we say rather than in the world, cuts both ways: it relieves criticism of an impossible burden of proof and exposes the machinery by which reputations are built.
A Talk That Refused to Conclude
Wittgenstein builds the argument from examples: a merchant ship, a chess problem, Trotsky. These are cases in which we say what ought to be, not what is the case. He distinguishes knowing that a sentence is true from the quite different state of feeling that it is right: in the first we are acquainted with the world, in the second with an approval of it. The strangeness he describes is what such a thought would be for a creature without ethics, like text in a script we cannot decipher.
That strangeness is the lecture's point and its difficulty. The typescript circulated for decades before von Wright's edition, and readers have argued about how much coherent doctrine it contains. Cora Diamond reads it less as a finished argument than as a fault line inside ordinary language, where our most serious words point at nothing beyond our own saying. Recent posts on the lecture, and on Cavell's engagement with it, are gathered in the OLP online index, a quick route into the archive for readers arriving from another direction.
When a Critic Says That Book Is Good
The critic's sentence is the test case. "This novel is a masterpiece" does not translate readily into a fact about the novel's properties, yet it is not idle: it carries a claim about how to read and what to notice. The Lecture on Ethics suggests such sentences belong to a practice rather than a theory. We say the book is good because that is what we say, and the question worth pursuing is what our saying does, among a community of readers, to the book and to each other.
Cavell keeps this alive in Must We Mean What We Say?, where the ethical and the aesthetic interest appear as two ways language reaches beyond itself, and in The Claim of Reason, where criticism survives where determinate criteria run out. His pairing of reading with thinking, reading as a person captured by a text rather than testing propositions about it, offers a way to say what the lecture withholds: criticism may answer to reasons without answering to rules. Literary value then looks less like a property conferred on texts than a relation sustained among people who read, argue, teach and eventually forget them.
Ordinary Language and the Uses We Make of Books
Wittgenstein's remarks in the 1930s on Holderlin and Novalis show a writer unwilling to treat poetic meaning as content he could transcribe, and the Lecture on Ethics sits close to that refusal. Its claims concern the uses of words in ordinary life, and literature is one of them: a form of life in which some sentences move us and others console. What we call literary value is at home at the kitchen table and at a festival panel, not in a technical vocabulary borrowed from aesthetics.
Australian usage offers a reminder of how far the ordinary reaches. Here ethics is nearly always pronounced /ˈɛθɪks/, the older ethick still intelligible to anyone who has read eighteenth-century criticism, and value in a literary argument often arrives wearing commercial clothes: the market, the canon, the standard, the risk. That vernacular bluntness is useful to a philosophy of language, which forgets at times that the words it studies are words people actually use.
The same habits of speech show in Meanjin in Brisbane, Overland in Melbourne, Voiceworks in Canberra and The Lifted Brow in Adelaide, where essays on the worth of a book tend to begin from reading habits rather than criteria. The judgement is made in the first person, about what a novel does to a life.
The Machinery of Reputation Here
If value rests in what we say, the institutions that organise saying matter. Australian literary life offers a dense network for watching value circulate: the Vogel Awards for unpublished manuscripts, the Miles Franklin Award, state prizes, the Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney writers' festivals, the Dunstan Push in Adelaide, and small magazines that outlast the fashions they were founded in.
Two Australian resources make that circulation unusually visible. Trove, run by the National Library of Australia, digitises newspapers so one can watch a novel's reputation form in the week it appeared, and AustLit, hosted at the University of Queensland, records the citation trails that keep a book alive in reading lists. Counting citations measures the persistence of a value judgement rather than its warrant, which is the confusion the lecture was assembled to dislodge.
The warning is not a licence for indifference. Our grounds for saying a book is good are our way of life: the readers we belong to, the classics we were raised on, the arguments we have had about poetry. Prises, panels and canons are places where a community does its thinking out loud.
Where to Begin
Two short routes through the material, one philosophical and one local.
Core philosophical texts
- Wittgenstein's "Lecture on Ethics", as edited by G. H. von Wright in the Philosophical Review, 1969.
- Cavell's The Claim of Reason and Must We Mean What We Say?.
- Cora Diamond on Wittgenstein and the difficulties of value, and on injustice.
- The Wittgenstein Archive at Trinity College, Cambridge, for the manuscript and notes.
Australian reception and teaching materials
- AustLit bibliographies and citation records for local authors and journals.
- Trove's digitised Australian newspapers, searchable by title and year.
- Meanjin and Overland essays on the canon and on what a novel is worth.
- Courses and reading groups in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide that set the lecture beside local poetry.
A companion resource, though it concerns speech rather than books, is a study of the relationship between stuttering, which presses a question the lecture brushes past: who is heard, who is judged, and on what grounds.
Reading On: An Invitation to the Skeptical Reader
The lecture is unfinished by design, and the useful response to it is argumentative rather than commemorative. Readers can browse the archive and the Cavell and Wittgenstein resources on this site, send a review, propose a symposium panel, or forward a conference notice or call for papers to the editors.
Such contributions keep the site a scholarly conversation rather than a shelf. An account of a reading group that tested the lecture against Australian poetry, a note on how a prize panel reasons about value, or a review of a new edition will all find readers here. Write to the editors, subscribe to the journal's updates, and put your own reading of the lecture into the exchange.