Austin’s How to Do Things with Words for reading drama
Austin’s How to Do Things with Words is a powerful tool for analysing dialogue in drama because it shifts attention from what a line means to what it does in a situation. Its account of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts lets readers ask whether a character is asserting, warning, promising, apologising or commanding. Learn more about Wittgenstein S Culture And Value As A Source For Literary Criticism.
Dramatic speech is especially suited to this inquiry. “I forgive you” and “You have no right to say that” do more than exchange information: they attempt to change a relationship. Stage directions, props, institutions and histories establish the conditions under which such words can succeed or fail, while audiences respond to representations as well as characters.
Australian dramatic culture offers a rich field for this approach. Leah Purcell’s The Convert, seen at Belvoir in Sydney and QPAC in Brisbane, makes religious conversion, law and Indigenous sovereignty audible in contested speech. Melbourne’s café routines supply smaller examples, such as “I’ll have a flat white, thanks,” which performs an order as naturally as a character issues a command.
The method is most useful when dialogue is treated as situated action rather than transparent exposition. It connects Austin to ordinary-language criticism, clarifies how fictional speech differs from real commitments, and supports close analysis of texts, stagings and the Australian institutions that circulate both.
Utterance, act and circumstance
Developed from Harvard lectures delivered in 1958 and published in 1962, Austin’s book distinguishes three connected dimensions of language use. A locutionary act concerns the sentence uttered; an illocutionary act concerns the force of the utterance; a perlocutionary act concerns what follows. “I promise” does not merely describe a future event: under suitable circumstances it undertakes a commitment.
Dramatic language makes these levels visible. Dialogue tags can identify an assertion, warning or plea, but punctuation alone cannot secure an illocutionary reading. The same words change force when addressed to a police officer, a child or a friend. Performative verbs such as “name,” “swear,” “apologise” and “forgive” make the act especially explicit.
Reading force beneath the line
Close reading should begin with cues within the dramatic situation: dialogue tags, reporting verbs, imperatives, pronouns, modality and surrounding action. “Must,” “might” and “ought” signal different commitments, while “here,” “that” and “you” bind a line to stage space and addressees. Austin helps convert these grammatical clues into hypotheses about speech acts.
Consider: “I promise the money is gone.” “You swear it?” “I swear on my mother’s name.” The first line offers assurance, perhaps a guarantee; the second challenges its force; the third invokes truthfulness and familial authority. Whether the promise is felicitous depends on circumstances the critic must reconstruct, including money, kinship, reputation and the speaker’s capacity to commit.
Theatre tests the conditions of saying
Fiction complicates Austin’s account of successful performance. A character’s promise creates an obligation inside the dramatic world, not for the actor, while “You are dismissed” may have force only because the fictional office grants authority. Yet theatrical events are real encounters: a line can wound, expose or move an audience member without making the actor legally bound. Performative force and fictional status therefore operate on different levels.
Stage conventions supply missing conditions. A prop can turn a token into evidence; a doorway can authorise exclusion; a pause can make an invitation expire. In productions of The Convert, religious, legal and Indigenous voices collide, making claims about belief, consent and ownership audible as competing attempts to act. The point is not to flatten theatre into courtroom logic, but to trace who is permitted to speak and who must translate.
Context, culture and inherited authority
Wittgenstein shifts attention from dictionary definitions to language in use, and the argument in Wittgenstein, culture and value shows how literary criticism can treat cultural inheritance as part of meaning. In dialogue, an apparently ordinary phrase may carry a history of respect, resistance or subordination that changes when it is uttered.
Australian usage offers instructive variation. “No worries” can acknowledge concern, waive a minor grievance or close an exchange; “good onya” can praise, tease or signal solidarity. A Melbourne stranger’s request and a family member’s request may share “Bring me a coffee” while performing different levels of entitlement. On a crowded Sydney bus, “Move up” may be a practical request, a rebuke or an appeal to collective responsibility.
A practical method for reading dramatic dialogue
A productive workflow begins with transcription. Mark each consequential verb, distinguish character, actor and playwright, note who has the floor, and reconstruct the scene’s institutional and emotional conditions. Then test each major utterance for its intended and conventional force, followed by its likely effect on other characters and audience. Comparing two stagings reveals which effects arise from wording, delivery, blocking, costume or space.
Australian readers encounter such materials through a mixed market of specialist publishers, including Melbourne’s Currency Press, independent bookshops and national booksellers, while productions circulate among Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Adelaide. Scholarly work must also respect the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), which governs protected play texts and recorded performances, and the Australian Consumer Law, embedded in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which applies to ticketing contracts and misleading sales claims. These legal frames do not determine interpretation, but they shape the public conditions under which plays are accessed, staged and discussed.
Limits and literary consequences
Austin’s framework has limits. The sharp contrast between constative and performative utterances cannot remain absolute, and later speech-act theory refined his categories. Drama also tests priorities: a hesitant “Maybe” can matter more than a perfect grammatical sentence, while silence, interruption and physical action can carry illocutionary force that vocabulary alone cannot explain.
Even with these qualifications, Austin changes what literary criticism hears. Stanley Cavell’s attention to ordinary language, acknowledgement and moral difficulty sits comfortably beside this method, allowing critics to connect a character’s wording to the claims and risks of recognition. The resulting account of dialogue is richer: lines become negotiations of authority, intimacy, obligation and resistance, not simply vehicles for plot or evidence of a stable theme.
Take one scene from an Australian play, transcribe its speech acts, and test which words depend on institutional permission, relationship or cultural inheritance. A comparison with a recorded or live production can then show how sound, timing and space alter the force that the printed page only partly records.
Explore OLP & Literary Studies Online for curated bibliographies, archived criticism, conference news and calls for papers, alongside resources on Stanley Cavell and Wittgenstein. The archive provides a starting point for extending Austin’s method across literary studies, performance research and ordinary-language philosophy.